Inference, Interpretive Strategies, and Strategic Interpretation: A Reading of Wittgenstein's *Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus* and *Philosophical Investigation*  
[PP: 25-33]

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**ABSTRACT**

Wittgenstein's analytic enterprise represents a major intellectual challenge for the philosophy of science and for a variety of humanistic disciplines. Reconstructing the epistemic fabric of logic and problematizing the nature of reasoning and argumentation, Wittgenstein's intellectual stance compels theorists and critics to revise their methods of argumentation and of making inferences, and forces them to question the validity of the techniques used in textual exegesis. The aim of this paper is to offer a reading of Wittgenstein's *Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus* and *Philosophical Investigations* that represent the fulcrum of his thought. The reading focuses on Wittgenstein's reevaluation of logical reasoning, his refutation of Russell's theory of types, and his concepts of logical atomism, the picture theory of language, and language-games. The paper also investigates the impact of Wittgenstein's thought on the process of interpretation of texts, and how his thought sets an example of how interpretive strategies should proceed without a priori assumptions or transcendental hypothesizing. Refusing a whole gamut of idealist, rationalist, and empiricist techniques used to verbalize reality and offer interpretations of a state of affairs, Wittgenstein calls for interpretive strategies – and not a strategic or codified interpretation – that are not enclosed on a set of stable signifieds and that do not emanate from preplanned strategies.

**Keywords:** Inference, Theory of Types, Logical Atomism, Picture Theory of Language, Language Games, Interpretation

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**1. Introduction**

Wittgenstein's analytic philosophy is a philosophy that has challenged the premises and the intellectual inevitabilities of a whole gamut of transcendental idealistic philosophies, continental philosophy, rationalist philosophies, and empiricism. Taking into consideration the fact that the archaeology\(^{(1)}\) of our knowledge and our system of representation are governed by rules that transcend the rules of grammar and logic, Wittgenstein's analytic approach revisits and questions the actual mode of being of both grammar and logic. Influenced by Bertrand Russell's analytic approach, Wittgenstein, in his early stages, saw that all our intellectual impasses and logical paradoxes can be solved if the ambiguities of logic and grammar are resolved. For Wittgenstein, philosophy should start with an exploration of the nature of a proposition, and philosophers "can render a genuine service by carefully unraveling complex problems whose origin rests in the imprecise use of language, /because/ scientific language contained ambiguities of logic, which required clarification" (Fieser, 2020, P. 439).

The intellectual deadlock, that represents a real challenge in the history of philosophy, is that gap that exists between what can be expressed through our language – through our system of representation – and what can be thought but cannot be expressed and communicated within the contours of this system of representation. Throughout the history of philosophical thought, this gap – or, in other words, the interstitial space between what can be said and what cannot be – has been approached by all the intellectual and humanistic disciplines. Cartesian rationalism has proved that perception can be misled and deceived, and, hence, it was renounced as an untrustworthy tool for verbalizing truth and formulating knowledge. The Cartesian Cogito with its internal light of reason has, thus, imposed itself as the tool that can verbalize
knowledge. In addition to Descartes's Cogito, Kantian a priori synthetic method is another rationalist attempt at approaching the aforementioned gap. Kant's empirical – transcendental subject has been announced as capable of – through the power of his pure reason – assimilating all a priori conditions and articulating all a posteriori conclusions. The Cartesian Cogito and the Kantian subjective – objective doublet are, however, entangled within a web of linguistic intricacies that determine the framework through which knowledge is communicated. They are prone to be misled by seemingly correct and well-written propositions and forms of reasoning.

The starting point, thus, for analytic philosophy has been to look at the infinite possibilities that can spring from a definite set of finite rules. These rules and the infinite possibilities they yield, however, cannot impede the hermeneutic urge of the human mind. Within the framework of analytic philosophy, a priori reasoning is not admitted, and, as a result, a whole body of concepts that have long been taken for granted have been problematized. Elementary propositions, for analytic philosophers, could be true or false, and, as a result, the nature of belief and justification is radically destabilized, or, rather, deterritorialized22. In Perspectives on the Philosophy of Wittgenstein, Block refers to Wittgenstein's remark in the Tractatus: "the sense of a proposition is independent of its truth and therefore elementary propositions could be true or false" (Block, 1983, P. VII).

Assuming that an elementary proposition could be a false one, an analytic philosopher confronts the dilemma of having concepts such as, belief, coherence, meaning, inference, and reasoning put under erasure. According to Audi, "even well-grounded beliefs can be mistaken" (Audi, 2005, P. 8). And, as a result, the whole epistemic relations and the nature of belief should be revisited. Recognizing the limits of the human mind, as has been asserted earlier by David Hume, analytic philosophy has allowed theorists and intellectuals to reevaluate the nature of belief and inference, the phenomenology of perception, and the role of imagery in memory and introspection. It is not the responsibility of philosophy, thus, to act as a science that endows us with clear-cut answers for all epistemological inquiries. According to Hutto, analytic philosophers "steadfastly object to those conceptions of philosophy that model it on some kind of knowledge-supplying science" (Hutto, 2014, P. 617).

In Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus, Wittgenstein postulates that the problems of philosophy can be solved if the logical structure of propositions is clarified. He offers much more complex forms of reasoning and dwells on the internal complexities of the premises we use. Mind bending as it is, the Tractatus enlarges the scope of logic and frees it from all forms of a priori reasoning. Wittgenstein illustrates that "nothing in the province of logic can be merely possible. Logic deals with every possibility and all possibilities are its facts" (in the Tractatus, 2.0121, 6). Influenced by Bertrand Russell, Wittgenstein considers the picture theory of meaning as one of the logical tools that can solve the enigmatic nature of language. For him, every word should correspond to a mental image in our minds. This reciprocal relation between every word and its corresponding reality is what Wittgenstein, still influenced by Russell's intellectual approach, refers to as logical atomism33. It is the logical method of analysis that separates entities into their different constituent parts, as opposed to holism that looks at entities as finally corresponding to lines of inevitability.

Wittgenstein's Philosophical Investigations is a complete about-face. Through the use of aphorisms, Wittgenstein reacts against Russell's analytic approach, and, also, against his own views concerning the picture theory of meaning and logical atomism, and endeavours to create a kind of logic and a philosophical method that can meet our realistic needs. According to Fieser, Wittgenstein, in the Investigations, "shifted his plan of analysis from a preoccupation with logic and the construction of a 'perfect' language to the study of the ordinary usages of language" (Fieser, 2020, P. 452). Thus, instead of investigating the mutual relations between words and their corresponding reality, Wittgenstein introduces language games as another important factor in determining meaning. He argues that a word has meaning only as a result of the rule of the game being played. Language is immersed into rules that can, sometimes, defy the body of logical rules, and can, actually, change our cognitive apparatus.

The present paper aims at offering a reading of Wittgenstein's Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus and Philosophical Investigations, considered as masterpieces in
the history of logical and philosophical inquiry, Wittgenstein's analytic logic has actually represented an intellectual challenge for the philosophy of science and for humanistic disciplines. His method of reading reality and analyzing language problematizes the process of interpretation, in general, and the process of offering literary and aesthetic interpretation of artistic works, in particular. The fact that Wittgenstein has pinpointed many logical paradoxes in our philosophical heritage has actually complicated the strategies of interpretation and questioned the epistemological fabric out of which the process of interpretation emanates. Negating the validity of a priori hypothesizing and questioning the credibility of the empirical-transcendental subject, Wittgenstein has – indirectly – directed the process of interpretation to opt for interpretive strategies that do not rely on preconceived notions, and that seek to explore relations of discursivity that are in function within the realm of the text studied.

2. Analytic philosophy: Inferences beyond Transcendentalism and A Priori Hypothesizing

Analytic philosophy is that branch of philosophy that investigates the scientific methods implemented in different scientific fields, and that dwells on the epistemological fabric of mathematics, logic, and a wide range of humanistic disciplines. It also comprises the intellectual attitude and effort of the scholars and theorists who are interested in the epistemological problems of psychoanalysis and the logic behind legal systems. An analytic philosopher performs a conceptual investigation of the structure of the language in which the concept studied is expressed. According to Fieser, analytic philosophy – sometimes referred to as linguistic philosophy – concerns itself with clarifying notions through an analysis of language, and, unlike the Hegelian tradition that endeavours to construct “Systems of thought regarding the whole universe” (438), it becomes “the logical clarification of thoughts” (the Tractatus 4.112 in Fieser, 2020, P. 438).

Emphasizing the logical analysis of concepts, analytic philosophy is thus a reaction against the holistic and the claimed intricately interwoven relationship between the mind and the world. Seeking a more objective method of analysis that pays heed to the minute and simple details, it advocates the idea that all philosophical propositions should be open to discussion and logical argumentation. In the Tractatus, Wittgenstein argues against the Hegelian dialectics and fixed points of reference. He says, “we cannot infer the events of the future from those of the present. Superstition is nothing but belief in the causal nexus” (Wittgenstein, 1974, 5.1361, P. 47). Analytic philosophy, thus, objects to the obfuscation that exists in the idealist tradition, and is after “simplex sigillum very” (41), and after reasoning and argumentation that are clear and simple and that proceed without preconceived notions.

Analytic philosophy, and the discipline of modern symbolic logic that actually concretizes its theoretical thought, react against the empiricist tradition – and this, I claim, in spite of the fact that many theories have indulged in an attempt to relate the analytic tradition to empiricism. Empiricists hold that it is only through observation and experimentation that justified beliefs about the world can be gained. In the Tractatus, Wittgenstein illustrates that,

Scepticism is not irrefutable, but obviously nonsensical, when it tries to raise doubts where no questions can be asked. For doubt can exist only where a question exists, a question only where an answer exists, and an answer only where something can be said (Wittgenstein, 1974, 6.51, P. 88).

Thus, many intellectual problems, that lurk hidden beyond this body of perceptual date, can really escape analysis if one is to depend mainly on the empiricist method. Pinpointing an epistemological weakness in the empiricist tradition, Morton illustrates that, “empiricism embodies a low-risk strategy: stick to the perceptual date. It is low-risk in the sense that it avoids the danger of immediate false beliefs” (Morton, 1996, P. 270).

Within the framework of analytic philosophy, and due to the methods of reasoning introduced by modern symbolic logic, the nature of inference, belief, and knowledge has been put under erasure. Copi illustrates that modern symbolic logic – that makes use of symbols to facilitate the discourse about nature of arguments – begins by first identifying the fundamental logical connections on which deductive argument depends. Using these connectives, a general account of such arguments is given, and methods for testing the validity of arguments are developed (Copi, 2009, P.315).

The nature of a proposition, premises, and conclusions has thus been problematized
when approaching methods of logical argumentation such as deduction, induction, and abduction. Tittle illustrates that "in the case of a deductive argument, the conclusion makes explicit what’s already implicitly contained in the premises; it merely articulates the logical implications of the premises" (Tittle, 2011, P. 61)

Turning topsy-turvy the way we look at the ontology of deductive, inductive, and abductive arguments, analytic philosophy has radicalized our notions concerning inference, justification, and belief. Analytic philosophers and logicians should, thus, look at the internal and minute components of the premises of an argument. According to Copi, "a general theory of deduction will have two objectives: (1) to explain the relation between premises and conclusions in deductive arguments, and (2) to provide the techniques for discriminating between valid and invalid deductions" (Copi, 2009, P. 315). In deductive arguments, that are both sound and valid, one, thus, has to present a linguistic structure that is valid and premises that are true.

Within the framework of analytic philosophy and modern symbolic logic, the nature of inference and the concept of justified beliefs have been modified due to the distinctions between deduction, induction, and abduction. Copi illustrates that, "a deductive argument makes the claim that its conclusion is supported by its premises conclusively. An inductive argument, in contrast, does not make such a claim" (Copi, 2009, P. 26). The process of reasoning, then, has to pay attention to the soundness and validity of arguments that are constituted of propositions, in order to allow the cognitive operation of inference to take place on a correct basis. Whereas deductive arguments move towards convergence and inductive arguments still yield a high degree of probability, the nature of abduction is still enigmatic in away that can be considered an epistemological challenge. According to Morton, referring to the nature of abduction,

The inference to the best explanation...does not care where the concepts come from, as long as the explanation that uses them is a good one. They can come from experience, but they can also come from the society around us, from previous theories, or anywhere at all (Morton, 1996, P.272).

This web of logical requirements, needed to present propositions that are sound and valid, and come up with arguments that are both valid and realistic – and this as far as deduction, induction, and abduction are concerned – has actually questioned many of the rationalist, idealist, and empiricist premises concerning the nature of thought, justified belief, and knowledge. The whole field of epistemology is actually facing an intellectual impasse, due to the new methods of reasoning presented through analytic philosophy and modern symbolic logic, and this as far as its ontological being as well as its epistemic credibility are concerned.

3. Wittgenstein’s Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus and the Reconstruction of Logic

The main concern of continental philosophy has been to establish truths that explicitly describe the facts of this world. The correspondence theory of truth has been a milestone and a trustworthy method of philosophical reasoning that can describe the totality of facts. In its search for universal truths, classical philosophy looks at that which typically corresponds to reality as a truth. In the Tractatus, however, the process of inferring and verbalizing this correspondence has been problematized by Wittgenstein’s analytic approach. Revolutionizing the relationship between thought, language, and the world, the book pinpoints essential intellectual paradoxes in the logic of our argumentation and in the way continental philosophy presents its propositions. The synecdochic character of the writing style of the Tractatus, implicitly, communicates the message that Wittgenstein is not after a truth or a well-written philosophical doctrine. Ishiguro illustrates that "in the Tractatus, Wittgenstein does not as a rule attempt to explain his own doctrines...Aphorism is his habitual form, both for challenging the doctrines of his contemporaries and for expressing agreement with them" (Ishiguro, in Block, 1983, P. 43).

In the Tractatus, Wittgenstein reacts against Russell’s theory of types. For Russell, the theory of types can deal with logical paradoxes arising from the unlimited use of predicate functions as variables. This predicate function is determined by the number and type of its arguments. According to Ladov, "Russell developed the theory of types in which paradoxes were solved at the level of revealing correct forms of thinking" (Ladov, 2019, P. 38). In the Tractatus, Wittgenstein rejects the theory of types in favour of a hierarchical construction that analyses the logic embedded in different
statements. Ishiguro explains that Wittgenstein thought that the theory of types gives us two theses: (1) that a proposition cannot make a statement about itself; (2) that a propositional function cannot take itself as an argument. These two theses were seen by him as truths about symbolization of language. They tell us what can and what cannot be expressed (Ishiguro, in Block, 1983, P. 48).

Wittgenstein’s hierarchy, however, is different from Russell’s. One can use a sentence to assert a proposition, and one can also use two different sentences that are made up of different words employing different syntactic rules to assert the same proposition. For Wittgenstein, “the hierarchy is not entered into language as some artificial methodological project for improving it” (Ladov, 2019, P. 42). Language, and its intricate web of syntactic and semantic relations, imposes its own rules. Ladov, thus, explains that, for Wittgenstein, the theory of types “is correct but that it is useless. We do not need it. The theory of types does not enter the hierarchy into the language; the hierarchy is already contained in it” (Ladov, 2019, P. 42).

In the Tractatus, Wittgenstein presents the idea that the world is made up of logical atoms that must carry interconnective properties. His theory of logical atomism has pinpointed miscellaneous hidden dimensions in the relationship between the thought, the world, and the language. Wittgenstein illustrates that, “one name stands for one thing, another for another thing, and they are combined with one another. In this way the whole group – like a tableau vivant – presents a state of affairs” (Wittgenstein, in the Tractatus, 1974, 4.0311, P. 26). By looking at the simple parts which constitute an entity, Wittgenstein is annihilating the role of a priori hypothesizing, and giving room for unnoticed and simple details to participate in the process of interpretation. Paying heed to "the simplest kind of proposition… [that] asserts the existence of a state of affairs" (Wittgenstein, in the Tractatus, 1974, 4.21, P. 36), Wittgenstein is actually problematizing the procedures of making inferences and presenting propositions. For him, it is not sufficient to just name the object, but it is essential to know its atomic logic and to situate the state of affairs the object denotes in its context.

The aforementioned idea of logical atomism has brought about one of Wittgenstein’s most controversial philosophical ideas; that of the picture theory of meaning. McGuinness illustrates that the Tractatus is the "classic statement of a realist semantics." and that "In [Wittgenstein’s] picture theory, an explanation is given of how propositions have sense " (McGuinness, in Block, 1983, P. 60). Logic, thus, should clearly point out the logical connections between signifiers and signifieds, and, for Wittgenstein, the process of presenting the rules of logic should be as clear as possible. Wittgenstein's controversial ideas have, thus, problematized the cognitive description of how the rules of logic should be verbalized, and challenged many concepts that have for so long been taken for granted. In his book on epistemology, Audi explains that, "as closely associated as knowledge and justified belief are, there is a major difference… We should look at both concepts independently to discern their differences, and we should consider them together to appreciate their similarities." (Audi, 2005, P.4). Thus, belief, coherence, causation, reasoning, and inference are all terms that have to be revisited in the light of the intellectual challenges brought about by analytic philosophy and modern symbolic logic.

In his article that investigates the influence of physics and mechanical engineering on Wittgenstein’s philosophy, Simões points out that “the Tractatus’ triumphant end is the decree of silence and mystical contemplation of the limits of language that presuppose the limits of the world, both components of the unspeakable sphere” (Simões, 2020, P. 94). Creating an interstitial space between the necessity of revisiting the taken-for-granted philosophical and logical ideas and the inevitability of recognizing the limits of our thought and our system of representation, Wittgenstein’s philosophical production succeeds in striking a balance between what can be said and what must be passed over in silence.

4. Wittgenstein’s Philosophical Investigations And The Labyrinth Of Language Games

Within the framework of Wittgenstein’s analytic approach, any sort of metalanguage that gives itself the freedom to say when a proposition is well-formed is not welcomed. All propositions and verbal forms of reasoning are deterritorialized and recontextualized. Further developing his picture theory of meaning, Wittgenstein, in Philosophical Investigations, has deepened
the dynamic and highly complex relationship between the thought, the language, and the world. Stenius illustrates that, "one might state that Wittgenstein later became dissatisfied with the picture theory as it was presented in the Tractatus. But this does not mean that he rejected it or considered it as one of the fundamental errors in this book." (Stenius, in Block, 1983, P. 111). For Wittgenstein, the process of how we recognize a sound as a word is a basic question for language theorists and for those who work in the field of neurolinguistics(5), and is indispensable in explaining how language and communication take place.

The cognitive process of the assimilation of meaning is thus a multi layered one. Wittgenstein, in the Investigations, elucidates that "our language can be seen as an ancient city: a maze of little streets and squares, of old and new houses, and of houses with additions from various periods." (Wittgenstein, in the Investigations, 1986, P.8). Language, sometimes, defies the rules of logic, and it, so often, acts as a syntagmatic, as well as a paradigmatic structure, simultaneously.

According to Anscombe, the main purpose of the opening of the Investigations is to persuade us not to look at the connection between a word and its meaning either as set up or as explained (a) by ostensive definition, or (b) by association, or (c) by mental pictures, or (d) by experiences characteristic of meaning one thing rather than another, or (e) by a general relation of reference or naming or designation or signifying which has (logically) different kinds of objects as its terms in different cases (Anscombe, in Block,1983,P. 154).

Our linguistic input is thus entangled within the web of language games, and, inevitably, all our perceptions, a priori hypothesizing, introspection, reasoning, and testimony-based beliefs should be recontextualized. Wittgenstein illustrates that, "[he] shall also call the whole, consisting of language and the actions into which it is woven, "the language-game"" (Wittgenstein, in the Investigations, 1986, P. 5). The interstices between the moment a sound is uttered and the moment in which the sound is assimilated by a human mind are invaded by heterogeneous factors that ultimately destabilize not only the meaning delivered but also the interpretation of it. Illustrating the relationship between name and thing named, Wittgenstein says that, This relation may also consist, among many other things, in the fact that hearing the name calls before our mind the picture of what is named; and it also consists, among other things, in the name’s being written on the thing named or being pronounced when that thing is pointed at (Wittgenstein, in the Investigations,1986,P.13).

It is, thus, the maze of a finite set of syntactic rules and sentence-types, that generates infinite words and sentences, is what envelopes our system of representation.

Considered a magnum opus on the nature of logical reasoning, language and linguistic meaning, Wittgenstein's Philosophical Investigations is a turning point and an intellectual challenge for the history of ideas, the philosophy of science, and the exegetical approach to literary and non-literary texts. According to Gakis, "Wittgenstein's remarks in the Investigations may be viewed as not merely concerning the nature of linguistic meaning and human intentionality in a technical manner, but as an investigation into the human condition, our selves, and our relations to other human beings" (Gakis, 2018, P. 231). Becoming more down-to-earth in the Investigations, Wittgenstein, in his attempt to "rethink the purpose and point of philosophy such that it can meet our true and achieve needs" (Hutto, 2014, P., 617), gives room to the human subject to act as an active participant in the process of meaning formation. In the world of the Tractatus, it is the triangle of the thought, the language, and the world. In the world of the Investigations, "the human subject becomes central in Wittgenstein's later phase, not of course as a traditional dualist Cartesian subject, but as socially instituting acting subject" (Gakis, 2018, P. 232).

5. Wittgenstein's Analytic Philosophy And Interpretive Strategies

Traditional theories of knowledge and critical approaches distinguish between a knowing mind, on the one hand, and the object of knowledge, on the other. Within the framework of critical approaches that still give prominence to the transcendent subject, such as phenomenology(6) and hermeneutics, for example, there is no distinction between consciousness and the phenomenon. In fact, all phenomena are ultimately contained in the very subjective act of experiencing something. Phenomenology marginalizes questions about the objective nature of things, and calls for an exploration of phenomena more subjectively. And hermeneutics elevates the role of the knowing mind as far as providing...
interpretation for human experiences and analysis of texts are concerned. The aforementioned argument presented by the analytic approach represents a real challenge for the intellectual basis of both phenomenology and hermeneutics. Questioning the logic that codifies our expression, Wittgenstein, in the Tractatus, explains that, "what can be said at all can be said clearly, and what we cannot talk about we must pass over in silence" (Wittgenstein, in the Tractatus, 1974, P. 3). Casting light on an epistemic area that lurks there beyond our power of expression, analytic philosophy poses an intellectual predicament for all the disciplines that still believe in the transcendental subject.

The field of ontology has also been subject to scepticism due to the argumentation presented by analytic philosophy and modern symbolic logic concerning the ontological discourse about the thing-in-itself. Hutto illustrates that Wittgenstein discards "such attempts to gain traditional metaphysical knowledge of the essence of things [because they] obscure and obfuscate" (Hutto, 2014, P. 618). Hegelian dialectics, then, that follows a fixed point of reference is greatly disturbed by the rules of syntax and by the rules that are beyond the logical structure of our linguistic input. In the Tractatus, Wittgenstein, indirectly, shatters the philosophical basis of the domain of ontology by drawing our attention to the epistemological gap that exists between the thing or the phenomenon and their verbal representation. He illustrates that, "the whole modern conception of the world is founded on the illusion that so-called laws of nature are the explanations of natural phenomena" (Wittgenstein, in the Tractatus, 1974, 6.371, P. 85).

Refuting the notion of the Kantian subjective-objective doublet, analytic philosophy has moreover, radicalized the concepts of reason and memory. According to Han, "Wittgenstein criticizes Russell’s theory of logical forms for involving the idea that our language must be anchored in extra-linguistic entities so that it makes a meaningful combination of signs" (Han, 2013, P. 115). These extra linguistic entities are the a priori conditions that are visualized and verbalized by the power of reason and human intellect. For Wittgenstein, however, the power of reason is, often, misguided by the interplay of signifiers and is, rarely, capable of verbalizing the truth of a particular state of affairs. In the Investigations, Wittgenstein says that, "language is labyrinth of paths. You approach from one side and know your way about; you approach the same place from another side and no longer know your way about" (Wittgenstein, in the Investigations, 1986, P. 45).

Recontextualizing the concept of reason, analytic philosophy has, indirectly, problematized the concept of memory. For Audi, for example, memory is not linked to or governed by the principle of causality. He argues that, could one... have an innate belief? If so, this could be about the past but not memorially connected with a past event, perhaps because the belief is possessed at the time one came into being and does not in any way trace to a remembered experience (Audi, 2005, P. 59).

Being an offspring of reason, memory, within the framework of analytic philosophy, is a mental capacity that can interact with the workings of the human mind, and can, I can claim, interfere in the processes of inference and presenting propositions and justifications. The analytic philosophy’s revolutionary attitude towards many of the key concepts, such as, reason, memory, belief, and justification, has actually shattered many methods that have been made use of when one is to get indulged in a process of offering literary or non-literary interpretation. In the Investigations, Wittgenstein, indirectly touches upon the issue of offering analysis and interpretation of a state of affairs. He says that, "what is essential is to see that the same thing can come before our minds when we hear the word and the application still be different. Has it the same meaning both times? I think we shall say not" (Wittgenstein, in the Investigations, 1986, P. 31). Within the framework of analytic philosophy, interpretive strategies applied to texts should proceed without a priori reasoning, without transcendental and extra-linguistic preconceived notions, and should pay heed to language-games that can actually reconstruct and redirect the interpretive strategies themselves.

6. Conclusion

Wittgenstein's analytic philosophy and modern symbolic logic have problematized the epistemological, as well as the ontological, enterprises. His thought has pinpointed an intellectual gap that exists between the thought, the language, and the world. This gap has actually deterritorialized many philosophical concepts that have for so long been taken for granted by the rationalist, the idealist, and the empiricist.
philosophers. One can claim that the depth of his thought and his philosophical method of revisiting the discipline of logic have represented an intellectual paradox for continental philosophy in general. Wittgenstein's concern about the conditions that have to be achieved in order to construct a perfect body of logic that explains the enigmatic nature of language has placed a variety of philosophical notions under erasure. His views about the nature of propositions have brought about a process of recontextualizing concepts such as inference, belief, memory, reason, perception, and introspection. Believing that our internal light of reason is entangled within the web of language-games, Wittgenstein has deepened our views concerning many cognitive strategies. The processes of recognizing contradictions, making inferences, thinking about thinking, reasoning logically, making interdisciplinary relations, among many others, have been reevaluated and recontextualized by theorists and philosophers concerned with the philosophy of science and the field of epistemology.

Wittgenstein's intellectual stance examines the status quo of a particular state of affairs before the contradiction is resolved, or not resolved. For him, "the philosophical ‘must’ is nonsensical in all its variations" (Engelmann, 2018, P. 2). Thus, the main task for philosophers and theorists is to look deeply into the discursive practices that help produce certain propositions, and further into the source of ambiguities or ruptures in the meaning delivered through a particular text or a specific philosophical context. Wittgenstein's modern symbolic logic reminds us that our system of representation will always be imprisoned within the boundaries of the pictorial language and the perplexing effect of language-games. It is, however, the task of philosophy and logic to step outside these boundaries in order to represent the cognitive fabric of logic and to recontextualize the methods used in scientific and critical thinking. For Wittgenstein, this philosophical investigation is incessant, eternally recurring, and should never be enclosed upon a definite signified.

Within the framework of Wittgenstein's analytic philosophy, the nature of deductive, inductive, and abductive reasoning has been problematized, and along with it the process of textual exegesis. With a whole gamut of false propositions, false premises, or false conclusions that can, yet, formulate a valid deductive argument, one finds oneself questioning truth claims, and, inevitably, questioning the epistemic techniques of textual exegesis. To escape this intellectual impasse, theorists and critics, as argued by Wittgenstein, should get involved in an act of theorizing, and not an act of formulating a theory. This act of theorizing would allow enough room to dig for concepts that have for so long been unquestioned, to create space for ruptures to float on the surface, and to live the reality of our system of representation coming from itself and referring to itself.

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Endnotes
1. Archaeology: It is the term used by Michel Foucault in his seminal book The Archaeology of Knowledge. The term is used to refer to the way systems of thought are constructed, and how knowledge is part of discursive formations that are in turn governed by enunciative functions.
2. Deterioritализation: deteriorationization is the term used by Gilles Deleuze in his book Difference and Repetition. The term is connotative of a philosophical process of recontextualizing concepts, and not only investigating what a concept means, but also what it cannot mean.
3. Logical atomism: For Fieser, "The complexity of facts [and relations between things] is matched by the complexity of language. For this reason the aim of analysis is to make sure that every statement represents an adequate picture of its corresponding reality" (Fieser, 2020, P. 440).
4. Simplicissimum verum: Wittgenstein uses this Latin expression in the Tractatus. It means: simplicity is the sign of truth.
5. Neurolinguistics: According to Pauranik, neurolinguistics, or cognitive neurolinguistics, "studies the relation of language and communication to different aspects of brain function, i.e. it tries to explore how the brain understands and produces language and communication. This involves attempting to
combine theory from neurology/neurophysiology (how the brain is structured and how it functions) with linguistic theory (how language is structured and how it functions). Structure (hardware) and function (software) are intricately interdependent and of equal theoretical and practical importance” (Pauranik, P. 1).

6. Phenomenology: Commenting on Husserl and how he marginalized the role of language and its power to shape the lived experience, Hanna says, “so for Husserl phenomenology has an a priori foundation, and its basic truths are synthetically necessary and a priori. It may than seem that Husserl is back safely in the Kantian fold of transcendental psychology” (Hanna, 2020, P. 58).

References: